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Building restrictions have long been assimilated to predial
servitudes.3 0 This is reiterated in the present case by the court's
holding that the restrictive covenant involved was a "continuous
nonapparent servitude" and could be established only by a
"title."'3 The court clarified the point that this title refers to
the transaction creating the servitude or building restriction,
and not to the subsequent transfers of the property. Since the
language of the document was clear and unequivocal, the building restriction constituted a servitude or real obligation running
with the land 3 2 binding on subsequent transferees. Although
building restrictions are generally established by the original
owners of a new subdivision, this is not an exclusive method,
and there appears no reason why a servitude or a building reservient estate for
striction cannot be established on a single
33
the benefit of one other dominant estate.
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Effect of Acceptance
In Boyet v. Perrymcn' the court dealt again with the problem
of heirs who seek to dispute the title to property conveyed by
the person from whom they inherit.2 The plaintiffs brought an
action of slander of title which was converted by the defendants
into a petitory action. The plaintiffs' grandfather owned half
of a quarter section. He conveyed 10 acres taken from this tract
to the defendant. When the seller died, the judgment of possession in his succession sent the heirs into possession of the entire
tract, without excepting the portion which had been sold. By
successive conveyances, the plaintiff's father acquired the interest of his six brothers and sisters. The plaintiffs contended that
they had acquired ownership of the 10-acre tract by prescrip30. Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841
(1938).
31. LA. CIvmI CODE arts. 727, 728, 766 (1870).
32. See also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2015 (1870).
33. Cf. the individual servitude of prohibition of building above a particular
height, mentioned in LA. CIVIL CODE art. 728 (1870).
*Member, Baton Rouge Bar, Special Lecturer, Louisiana State University
Law School.
1. 240 La. 339, 123 So.2d 79 (1960).
2. See, for example, Mims v. Sample, 191 La. 677, 186 So. 66 (1938);
Chevalley v. Pettit, 115 La. 407, 39 So. 113 (1905).
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tion. The court of appeal decided that the plaintiffs were owners of 4/7ths of the tract.8 In its original opinion the court reversed the court of appeal on the ground that the requisites of
ten-year good faith prescription had not been met.
On rehearing, the court reached the same result, but based
on the conclusion that the defendants' plea of "estoppel by warranty" should have been sustained. The plaintiffs' grandfather
had sold the tract of land with warranty. The plaintiffs' father
had accepted his succession unconditionally. The plaintiffs were
therefore bound by the "obligation of warranty" made by the
original vendor. The obligation was not destroyed when some
of the coheirs conveyed title to another coheir. The court distinguished 30 years prescription in this regard: "In such a case
the 30 year possession is in no way disputing the title of the
record owner. . . . In the instant case plaintiffs are pleading
the 10 years' acquisitive prescription and are asserting a title
derived from [plaintiffs' father's] coheirs, all of whom, as
stated, were bound by their father's warranty."
The question raised by the court's rationale of this decision
is whether either the warranty of title or estoppel binds a person
against future acts. This question and other aspects of this decision are discussed in Note elsewhere in this issue.
In Washington v. Washington,4 the court held that the privilege granted the widow in necessitous circumstances was not
extinguished by her failure to claim the privilege or to institute
a suit for a separation of patrimony within three months from
the acceptance by the heirs of her husband's succession. Neither
did the widow waive her privilege on the succession property
by failing to pray for recognition of her privilege when she
sought to recover her "widow's homestead." 5
The question whether the privilege of the widow in necessitous circumstances prescribes if she fails to institute a suit
for separation of patrimony within 90 days of the acceptance
of the succession by the heirs had been considered by the Court
of Appeal for the First Circuit in Danna v. Danna,6 and by the
3. 98 So.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1958).
4. 241 La. 35, 127 So.2d 491 (1960).
5. The court relied upon Perot's Estate v. Perot, 177 La. 640, 148 So. 903
(1933), in which a lessor's privilege was held not to have been waived when the
lessor filed a suit for personal judgment against a lessee without asserting the
privilege, and other cases.
6. 161 So. 348 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935).

1962]

CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS

319

Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit in Beck v. Beck. 7 In its
original opinion, the Supreme Court followed the decision in the
Danna case. On rehearing, the court stated that further study
had convinced it that the Beck decision was sound.
The court said that the suit for a separation of patrimony
must be instituted within 3 months, but this 3-month period does
not cause either the debt due the widow in necessitous circumstances or the privilege created by law to secure the payment
of that debt to prescribe. A privileged creditor need not seek
a separation of patrimony; so long as the debt itself has not
prescribed, "the privilege, which is an accessory right to secure
payment, does not.., prescribe."
The Title Examination Committee of the New Orleans Bar
Association filed a brief amicus curiae, urging that the 90-day
prescription allowed for the filing of suits for separation of
patrimony should apply to the privilege accorded the widow in
necessitous circumstances. The court therefore must have considered the effect of its decision on title examination. In this
case, one of the coheirs had purchased an interest in the succession from the other coheirs, and it was held that the privilege
of the widow in necessitous circumstances applied to the interest
which he had purchased. Other privileged debts affecting immovable property which exist without recordation 8 should be
treated in the same fashion. Justice Hamiter, dissenting in part,
thought that the privilege should not affect the interest thus
purchased. Justice Hamlin, dissenting, urged that title examiners
should not "be compelled ...

to require affidavits to the effect

that the 'widow's thousand' has been satisfied before finally
passing upon the merchantability of a title."
The decision appears inescapably to imply that the unrecorded privileges for expenses of last illness and those arising
on death of the owner of the property follow succession property
into the hands of third persons, who purchase it in good faith
from the heirs following a judgment sending the heirs into
possession of the estate. It therefore is necessary for title examiners to satisfy themselves that these debts have in fact been
paid if their clients are to be protected.9
7. 181 So. 635 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
8. See LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 19.
9. The Code of Civil Procedure does not affect the problem. Article 3007
permits the creditor of a succession to require security for the payments of the
debt due him within 3 months from the date of the judgment of possession when

